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Biology and ontology: Kant, Fichte,
and the uses of natural history
Michael Steinberg
1 Fichte presents himself as a Kantian, as continuing and developing Kant’s transcendental
philosophy. Yet at the same time he boasts of presenting something absolutely new, the
first philosophy of seeing, the first body of thought which is capable of grasping activity
rather than static entities, something so new that it has to have a novel and unique name
—Wissenschaftslehre, not philosophy.
2 These claims are not at all incompatible, however, and for Fichte they are in fact the
same, because he came to believe—not without justification—that Kant’s project was at
odds with Kant’s way of philosophizing. The critical philosophy could be carried forward
only through a radical transformation.
3 I cannot hope to justify such a generalization in a short paper. What I can do is unpack
the similarities and differences that are wound around a single,  seemingly tangential
subject: the two philosophers’ arguments from biology.
4 The most extensive discussions of biology in their work both came in the last decade of
the eighteenth century, in Kant’s Critique of Judgment and in Fichte’s System of Ethics and
Wissenschaftslehre  nova  methodo.  On  first  reading  the  accounts  appear  extraordinarily
similar, and if one encountered them in extracts it might even be hard to tell them apart.
For both men the distinctive characteristic of living organisms is their self-perpetuating
activity,  directed  to  maintaining  their  internal  structure  and  thus  their  continued
viability. Their form is a product of their actions and their actions are products of their
form, so living beings are both the cause and effect of themselves.1 Both also portray the
natural world as an interlocking complex of reciprocal and apparently purposeful activity
which binds separate and discrete organisms into a biological system. This should not be
a surprise, for they were drawing on ideas that were as dominant in the late eighteenth
century as neuroscience or evolutionary biology are today. There had been a significant
shift in Kant’s day towards theories that “vitalized nature,” and with this came a strong
interest in self-organization and self-generation as natural  properties.2 That shift  has
often been interpreted as a critical or even anti-rationalist responses to a mechanistic
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bias  in Enlightenment  thought,  but  as  Jennifer  Riskin has  recently  reminded us,  the
mechanism of the eighteenth century was less marked off from notions of intentionality
and even consciousness than is twenty-first century physicalism.3 The fascination with
automata  and  the  later  craze  for  Mesmer  show  mechanism  and  purposefulness
intermingling, and to think of man as a machine is to admit the possibility that machines,
in turn, might possess agency and awareness.
5 But the two philosophers begin to diverge as they move forward. Both invoke the notion
of  a  formative  drive  that  guides  and  impels  self-organization,  the  Bildungstrieb that
features  prominently  in  the  writing  of  Johann  Friedrich  Blumenbach,  Kant,  though,
praises Blumenbach not so much for his ideas as for his caution in applying them, and
interprets the drive as nothing more than the “ability of an organized body to take on …
organization.”4 Fichte, on the other hand, characterizes the Bildungstrieb as “a drive to
form or shape or to cultivate and ... a drive to allow oneself to be formed or shaped or
cultivated.”5 It is the distributed activity of the entire system of nature, exhibited both in
self-forming and self-maintaining organic wholes and in their reciprocal interactions.
6 There is a far more obvious way in which the two philosophers differ, though. Hardly
anything seems less Kantian than a discussion of biology, and biological drives at that, in
a System of Ethics. The moral law flies in the face of all inclination, and what are those
inclinations but the promptings of our nature as physical organisms? From a Kantian
perspective it is hard to see how biology could help us comprehend or comply with a law
that is grounded in something utterly apart from our physical being. By incorporating it
into his ethical treatise, though, Fichte seems to be moving in just that direction. 
7 And what role biology plays for Kant is almost equally problematic. As John Zammito, in
particular,  has  shown,  the  Critique  of  Judgment is  something  of  a  palimpsest. 6 Kant’s
emphasis if not his position changed repeatedly during its composition, and its different
layers are not always easy to reconcile. The third critique was meant to complete the
critical  philosophy,  and of  course  Kant  had no need of  a  fourth;  yet  how exactly  it
accomplishes this end is still debated. Worse yet, Kant wrote two introductions to the
work and in both he explained his aims, yet those introductions have quite different
emphases and focus on different problems. 
8 Both, however, shed light on his ambitions. In the first, which has a quasi-epistemological
focus, Kant explains that the work aims to sanction, though merely as a regulative idea,
the concept “that [nature’s] arrangement conforms to the ability we have to subsume the
particular laws, which are given, to more universal laws, which are not given.”7 We may
proceed  as  if  nature  were  amenable to  the  systematization  of  rational  thought  and
theorize as  if  our theories  line up with the underlying order of  things,  although we
cannot assert that homology as a fact. 
9 Kant’s reserve, though, is slightly disingenuous. Paul Franks has recently argued that the
entirety of his critical philosophy responds to the lack of any ultimate grounding to the
empirical, which Kant resolves by asserting two orders of explanation and then showing
the dependence of the ungrounded order on a supersensual order which is grounded and
which has its own, non-theoretical claim to validity.8 Interpreters and critics from Jacobi
on to the present have seen that this solution depends on Kant’s ability to show that these
two orders are related; as Kant himself wrote in the famous letter to Marcus Herz:
I  had  said  [in  the  Inaugural  Dissertation]:  The  sensuous  representations  present
things as they appear, the intellectual representations present them as they are.
But by what means are these things given to us, if not by the way in which they
Biology and ontology: Kant, Fichte, and the uses of natural history
Revista de Estud(i)os sobre Fichte, 17 | 2018
2
affect us? And if  such intellectual representations depend on our inner activity,
whence comes the agreement that they are supposed to have with objects—objects
that  are  nevertheless  not  produced  thereby?  And  the  axioms  of  pure  reason
concerning  these  objects—how  do  they  agree  with  these  objects,  since  the
agreement has not been reached with the aid of experience?9
Kant calls this “the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics..... What
is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object?”10 
10 Theoretical reason is reliable as an inquiry into phenomena, so much so that we can agree
that it will continue to guide us through all possible experience. But experience of what?
If we know nothing but phenomena, how can we know that we are not simply trapped
within a compellingly consistent delusion? The first introduction shows that the Critique
of Judgment addresses this question, and indeed it does so more comprehensively than
Kant’s earlier attempts, incorporating biology in a far more subtle way than he did in the
relatively straightforward argument from design found in the first Critique’s Canon of
Pure Reason.11 
11 In that argument Kant repeatedly invokes teleology. Yet it is not teleology itself which
suggests this solution; it is our inability to decide between mechanistic and teleological
explanations of organic life. Because we find ourselves with two valid lines of inquiry, we
have reason to think that we are interpreting something about which both
interpretations are simultaneously true. The very incompatibility of the claims which
nature seems to force on us suggests an unknowable perspective which guarantees a
harmony or at least a resonance between the order of our thoughts and the noumenal
order. As Kant writes, it is through the need for teleological explanation “that reason has
a certain suspicion, or that nature gives us a hint, as it were, that if we use the concept of
final  causes  we could perhaps reach beyond nature and connect  nature itself  to  the
highest point in the series of causes.”12 
12 The rich suggestibility of  this approach is  most evident in sections 76 and 77 of  the
Critique, which speak of the intuitive intellect or intellectus archtypi. This notion had stood
at the apex of the critical philosophy at least since the 1772 letter to Herz. For such an
intellect,  cognition of  objects  is  at  the same time their  actualization.13 There are  no
mediating concepts for the simple reason that there is no room for them; the possible and
the actual are one and the same, and this intellect is thus all-productive as well as all-
knowing.14 
13 But the distinction between noumenon and phenomenon is put in danger if we merely
bring perceptual form to content which proceeds directly from the intellectus archtypi.
The pantheistic  implications of  the idea that the world is  a realization of  the divine
intellect would be evident even to a lesser thinker than Kant writing at a time other than
at the height of the pantheism controversy. Kant is thus pulled in two directions at once.
He  cannot  do  without  biological  purposiveness,  but  he  cannot  give  teleology  any
constitutive role without destroying the very argument he is trying to build. He cannot do
without the intuitive intellect, but he cannot grant that we could have any immediate
apprehension of that intellect’s thoughts even though these might seem to be laid out
before our eyes as the objects of perception. It is not for nothing, then, that some have
interpreted the Critique of Judgment as a text aimed at limiting the damage that theories
like Blumenbach’s could cause. This risk was clearly evident in Herder, and it is widely
granted  that  significant  aspects  of  Kant’s  treatment  of  biology  were  developed  as  a
critique of his former pupil.
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14 That critique is strongest in sections 72 and 73,  in which Kant outlines four possible
“systems concerning the purposiveness of nature.” He dismisses all four; none of them
“accomplishes what it alleges to accomplish.” But Kant’s dismissal of the third system,
the  notion  of  an  immanent  purposiveness  in  nature  which  he  labels  hylozoism,  is
especially and tellingly peremptory.
15 Kant gives two reasons to reject hylozoism. He dismisses the possibility that matter itself
might be alive with a wave of his hands:
[W]e cannot even think of living matter as possible. (The concept of it involves a
contradiction, since the essential character of matter is lifelessness, inertia.)15
This is hardly a strong argument. We may well have a concept of matter as lifeless and we
may even be compelled to think of it that way, but this says nothing about what matter is
in itself or even if there is something to which the concept of “matter” properly applies.
16 Kant also rejects hylozoism because, he insists, any appeal to it is circular. Yet this is not a
defect if the circle is a virtuous rather than a vicious one.16 What is more, one can see the
entirety  of  the  critical  philosophy  as  itself  a  circular  argument  that  “make[s]  trial
whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that
objects must conform to our knowledge.”17 Kant does not explain why we cannot make a
similar trial of hylozoism.
17 He does not do this, of course, and of the four accounts Kant prefers theism. He begins
with faint praise: it too fails, but it does so less than the others. But he soon leaves this
caution  behind.  If  this  postulate  of  an  intelligent  cause,  he  tells  us,  “is  perfectly
satisfactory for all speculative and practical uses of our reason from every human point of
view, then indeed I would like to know just what we have lost if we cannot also prove it
valid for higher beings, i.e., prove it from pure objective bases (to which unfortunately
our powers do not extend).”18 
18 Yet  this  strong  and  uncharacteristically  direct  conclusion  depends  crucially  on  the
rejection of hylozoism. It is thus resting on a very slim reed indeed. It is hard not to
conclude that something else is going on here, that Kant’s insistence that theism “is based
on an indispensable [and] necessary maxim of our judgment”19 is underdetermined by the
arguments presented and correspondingly overdetermined by considerations which he
does not acknowledge. 
19 I would suggest that what is at work here is nothing inherent in the logic of the critical
project  in  itself,  nor  is  it  something  derived  from  Kant’s  need  to  maintain  the
independence  of  the  ethical  subject—he  does  not  make  that  argument  in  the  third
Critique and to do so would reduce human individuality to the status of a postulate. It is
an  ontology  to  which  Kant  adhered  throughout  his  career,  formed in  dialogue  with
Leibniz and Wolff and passing without essential revision into the critical philosophy. Kant
consistently envisioned a universe of real individuals with intrinsic properties, and he
saw those individuals as engaged in real interactions, made possible by and carried out in
accordance with the inherent properties of a unitary ground.
20 We find this  in  his  first  major  philosophical  work,  the  “New Exposition of  the  First
Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge” of 1755, whose Proposition XIII reads:
Finite  substances  by  their  mere  existence  are  unrelated  and  are  obviously  not
involved in interaction (commercio) except to the extent that they are maintained
by  the  common  principle  of  their  existence,  namely,  the  divine  intellect,  in  a
systematic pattern based on mutual relations.20
Kant’s demonstration of this proposition concludes:
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[T]o the extent that single substances have an existence independent of others and
there is no place for their mutual connections, the least that follow is that it  is
certainly not the lot of finite things to be the [creative] causes of other substances.
Nevertheless,  since  all  things  are  found  assembled  in  an  all-embracing  mutual
connection,  it  must  be  admitted  that  this  relationship  depends  on  mutual
participation in a common cause, namely God, the general principle of existence.
But as a matter of fact, the mutual relations of these things do not follow simply
because God founded their existence; it follows only inasmuch as the schema of the
divine intellect which provides for their existence conceives of their existence as
correlated and so has established their relationships.21
In the “Inaugural Dissertation” of 1770, as well, Kant argues that the principle of the
intelligible world is what makes it possible “that a plurality of substances should stand in
a relation of interaction.”22
21 A great deal of Kant’s thinking changed between 1755 and the first Critique, but Kant did
not change his mind about what a proper metaphysics should look like; while the scope of
possible metaphysical knowledge is significantly narrower in the critical philosophy, it is
knowledge of the same underlying shape of things. One might even say that the critical
philosophy  aims  at  nothing  less  than  the  generation  of  that  shape;  starting  from
individual experience it leads us to the confidence that an intelligible world exists, that it
grounds and connects the phenomena we experience, and that an unknowable agent has
ordained and established both. 
22 This is the framework for Kant’s practical philosophy, too, which is just as much in need
of an ontology as the theoretical philosophy. The Critique of Practical Reason had left a
fundamental  question  unanswered  which  Kant  did  not  address  until  the  Critique  of
Judgment, and even there it is something of a latecomer, appearing explicitly only in the
second, published introduction, written after what Zammito terms Kant’s “ethical turn.”
“[I]t must be possible to think of nature as being such that the lawfulness in its forms will
harmonize with at least the possibility of [achieving] the purposes that we are to achieve
in nature according to the laws of freedom,”23 Kant says. This is his other explanation for
the aims of the third Critique, and it demands a much stronger resort to the intelligible.
One can imagine a naturalistic explanation for the first homology, but the amenability of
nature to ethical  transformation is  significantly harder to conceive of  in naturalistic
terms, and in that context Kant’s appeal to the divine is perhaps more forgivable. Yet that
problem arises only because Kant has always already separated the realms that he now
seeks to unite or at least reconcile. 
23 Kant does not reject hylozoism, then, because the arguments in its favor are weak. He
cannot  accept  it  because  it  is  inconsistent  with  his  fundamental  ontological
commitments. It recognizes no truly intrinsic properties, only relational ones. It leaves no
separation between inner and outer and between the individual and its environment—
which, of course, is where idealism moves, Fichte most decisively.
24 This does not mean that the Kantian distinction between noumenon and phenomenon is
lost.  What  Fichte  does  is  transform  Kant,  not  reject  him,  and  his  incorporation  of
epigenetic biology could only succeed after he had worked that transformation. He could
not simply usher in what Kant had kept out; to claim a theoretical grasp of the noumenal
from the  evidence  of  biology would indeed betray  the  critical  project  entirely,  as  it
arguably does with Herder. 
25 Several steps in that transformation may be noted here. First of all, Fichte certainly saw
Kant’s work as incomplete in that it could not present a unified account of the various
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faculties  of  the  mind.  But  Fichte  was  not  merely  searching for  a  more  fundamental
ground of explanation. He was examining a more fundamental subject. If Kant starts with
the question of how our inner representations can refer to external objects, Fichte asks
how the separation of  inner representations from external  objects  arises  in the first
place.
26 Kant’s ontology simply assumes the existence of a subject and a realm of objects, and
from the perspective of  the Wissenschaftslehre it  therefore starts  too late.  It  takes  its
starting point as a given rather than as the problem that it is.  This point is made as
concisely as possible in Fichte’s notes for his 1812 Lectures on the Theory of Ethics: Kant
“already possesses consciousness as something that is familiar. Hence, mere facticity. We
do not [proceed] this way,” says Fichte. “[We] allow the I and consciousness to first come
into being.”24
27 This facticity obscures the roots of  self-consciousness and the I,  and not even Kant’s
genius  can  cross  the  boundary  lines  drawn  in  accordance  with  his  ontological
assumptions. But it also leaves us with the appearance of a fixed point around which our
theories  can proceed,  and as  Fichte wrote at  the height  of  the atheism controversy,
“something stable, at rest, and dead can by no means enter the domain of what I call
philosophy, within which all is act, motion, and life. This philosophy discovers nothing;
instead, it allows everything to arise before its eyes.”25
28 And what arises  before the philosopher’s  eyes is  the noumenal  itself,  but  as  activity
rather  than  object.  This  is  another  step  in  Fichte’s  transformation  of  the  critical
philosophy.  For Kant the noumenal was the supersensible system of real  objects and
individuals. For Fichte, on the other hand, the noumenal is not the supersensible itself, as
Kant often suggests,26 but the activity through which the intelligible will—the only true
supersensible—manifests as both experience and its objects. As he notes, Kant “calls ...
[the noumenal, which lies at the basis of sensible representations] ‘something.’ But this is
not something that possesses being; ... rather [it is] acting.”27 
29 For Kant the relationship between noumena and phenomena is one between archetype
and instance and the relationship between our theories and the unknowable that we
theorize about is fundamentally mimetic. For Fichte the relationship is different. It is that
between process and product—but this statement needs immediate clarification, because
product  and  process  are  not  to  be  distinguished.  To  quote  again  from  the
Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo:
A noumenon lies at the foundation of appearance. More precisely, the entire world
is both an appearance and a noumenon. … The noumenon and the appearance are
one and the same thing, merely viewed from two different sides in consequence of
the necessary duality of the mind.28
That is, the ceaseless activity of the noumenal and the stable phenomena of ordinary
perception are identical. Here, as so often, it is easy to see how much Hegel took from
Fichte; the famous image of the “bacchanalian whirl” in the preface to the Phenomenology
is a poetic expression of the very same thought.
30 As different  as  Fichte’s  noumenon is  from Kant’s,  however,  it  is  just  as resistant  to
theoretical  comprehension.  The  necessary  condition  of  self-conscious  experience,  its
articulation into I and not-I, renders every experience into a subjective perception of an
objective world. Self-awareness itself imprisons us in the phenomenal, placing us in the
quandary summed up by Novalis in an epigram that loses much of its sense and all of its
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wit in translation, “Wir suchen überall das Unbedingte, und finden immer nur Dinge.”29
Anything that we can think about is eo ipso not the noumenal.
31 For neither Kant nor Fichte is the noumenal completely inaccessible, however, and for
both of them it is practical reason that gives access, not theoretical reason. And yet this
marks another Fichtean transformation of Kant. For Kant the one point of contact is the
fact of freedom under the moral law. It is something known. For Fichte, by contrast, the
noumenal is the very movement that the Wissenschaftslehere directs us to observe, and it is
grasped not through discursive thought but through our own embodied activity.  It is
something felt.30
32 And  this  brings  us,  at  last,  to  Fichte’s  engagement  with  biology.  In  some  ways  its
placement in the System of Ethics is not as un-Kantian as it might sound. The discussion
forms a significant part of the second large division of the text, which is devoted to a
“deduction of the reality and applicability of the principle of morality” and aims to show
both “the idea of what we ought to do” “and the substrate in which we ought to approximate
the realization of this idea.”31 
33 This recognizably raises the same issue that Kant addresses in the second introduction to
the  Critique  of  Judgment,  the  amenability  of  the  world  of  experience  to  ethical
transformation. What Fichte does, then, is bring together some of the arguments in Kant’s
second and third critiques,  and there are sound and thoroughly Kantian reasons for
integrating them. Where Fichte diverges from Kant is how he resolves this problem. In
fact, his transformation dissolves Kant’s formulation of the task and constitutes it as a
different one. 
34 Fichte embraces the epigenetic biology of Blumenbach and shares both the contemporary
fascination with self-generation, the inherent irritability and intentionality of matter,
and an equally common hydrostatic model of drives. He also interprets the compound
notion of the Bildungstrieb so that it  embraces both the constitution of self-contained
organic  wholes  and  the  homeostatic  maintenance  of  those  organisms  through  their
reciprocal interactions.32 Fichte thus reads the Bildungstrieb as a rendition of the creative
activity  which  unfurls  itself  as  the organized  whole  of  the  natural  world  and  as
experience itself. 
35 Where epigenetic biology gives Kant a hint of an ordering agency at work, then, it gives
Fichte a direct insight into the movement of the noumenal. And this is where Fichte has
shifted Kant’s problem. Kant had to show that the natural world was amenable to the
purposes of the moral law, and he could do this only through an off-stage intelligence.
Fichte dissolves the fixity of self and world into movement, and having done so he has to
show  that  this  movement  tends  towards  the  free  self-activity  of  all  of  its  human
instantiations. In other words, the moral law must be implicated in into the movement of
the drives. 
36 This transformation of the problem was carried out, it should be noted, through the steps
outlined above. By locating the Wissenschaftslehre’s inquiry at a point prior to existence of
the  I  Fichte  opened  the  door  to  conceiving  individuals  as  manifestations  of  a  pre-
individual activity. He then identified that activity with the noumenal itself. But Fichte
would fall  back into Kant’s problem and indeed into a quasi-Cartesian dualism if  the
impetus  towards  self-activity—freedom—does  not  ground  the  noumenal;  a  drive  to
freedom that is superadded to the complex of natural drives would stand to those drives
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as Descartes’ mind does to body. What is worse, perhaps, is that we would have no reason
to conclude that the ends proper to the one could be realized through the others.
37 It  would  require  at  least  another  paper  to  show  in  sufficient  detail  how  Fichte
accomplishes this, so a few signposts will have to suffice. Readers of the System of Ethics
will recall that the sole guide to the ethical quality of an act is the accompanying feeling,
and that this sense of contentment—Zufriedenheit—arises from the harmony of the drives
accomplished by the act, which fulfills at once the interests of the natural drive and the
ends of freedom as conveyed through the pure drive.33 But this is not a synthesis but a
reunification or a realization of an inherent unity. As Fichte writes, “All phenomena of
the I rest solely upon the reciprocal interaction of these two drives, which is, properly
speaking, only the reciprocal interaction of one and the same drive with itself.”34 It follows,
then, that the drive towards absolute self-activity, which is the moral law, must be an
aspect of the Urtrieb. As everything in existence is a manifestation of that drive, the moral
law must therefore be inherent in nature itself.35
38 From the ordinary point of view morality is opposed to nature, but this appears to be the
case only because we cannot help but constitute nature in opposition to the I. From the
transcendental perspective this opposition falls away. What we experience as nature is
the product of the same activity that we grasp as the moral law. Both manifest the “one
life” that Fichte hymns in the conclusion of The Vocation of Man. For Fichte as for Hegel, it
is only our way of seeing that blinds us to the fact that the entire world is the revelation
of the divine.36
39 It is a pity to stop here, because we are at the very heart of the Wissenschaftslehre and the
source of many of Fichte’s most challenging insights. But it should be clear enough by
now to see what Fichte’s employment of his contemporaries’ biological ideas says about
the tasks he set himself and where those diverges from Kant’s. 
40 Kant assumed that perception is a construal of a really existing world which we do not
and cannot grasp as it is. In some ill-defined but relevant way, however, the order of
those perceptions must line up with the unknowable order of the real. As Kant wrote to
Herz,  the  deepest  problem lies  in  establishing  that  connection,  and  Beiser  is  surely
correct to argue that Kant never resolved it to his satisfaction; he was still struggling with
it  in  the  Opus  Postumum.37 This  tension  between  ontological  separation  and
epistemological  resonance  accounts  for  Kant’s  deep  ambivalence  towards  biological
purposiveness;  though  needed  to  hint  at  the  connections  between  phenomenal  and
noumenal, it must be whisked off stage before it suggests that we know the noumenal
directly. It is too easily taken for a theory of what organisms are in themselves or as a
revelation of the ends of the divine.
41 For Fichte, on the other hand, biology poses no threat. It cannot produce the mirage of a
theoretical  grasp of  the noumenal  realm because the noumenal  is  not a realm to be
mapped out but an activity to be observed and felt. Epigenesis is simply one aspect of the
movement through which a unitary Absolute flows forth as both objective phenomena
and transcendentally structured subjectivity. In the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo the
interweaving  of  biological  purposiveness  is  thus  incorporated  into  the  fundamental
syntheses  of  consciousness,  united with our  own free  acting and thinking in  an all-
productive and all-embracing reciprocity.38 
42 In a sense these theories are inversions of one another.  In Kant’s phenomenal realm
individuals vanish in the ceaseless play of causality, while as noumena they subsist and
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interact  through  a  supersensible  ground,  their  intrinsic  properties  preserved  and
coordinated. For Fichte the noumenal is the realm of ceaseless activity, and in it there are
none but reciprocal relations.39 Individuality is a phenomenon, existing only within the
ordinary perspective, and is to be overcome in willing the moral law; it is only through
“the disappearance and annihilation of one’s entire individuality that everyone becomes
a pure presentation of the moral law in the world of sense and thus becomes a ‘pure I.’”40
We must live not for ourselves but as Reason itself,  and ethical life is thus a striving
towards the unity—both physical and mental—from which which self-positing emerges
but which it sunders and conceals. 
43 But much remains that is clearly Kantian. The Copernican Revolution is carried out with a
vengeance. The noumenal/phenomenal distinction remains and is invoked to maintain
the reality of freedom in the face of the mechanistic determinism of the phenomenal. The
universalizability  demand  of  the  categorical  imperative  is  not  just  retained,  it  is
embedded in the very structure of the Wissenschaftslehre as a whole; one acts ethically
only when one acts in consonance with the inner movement of the whole.
44 Kant’s in-itself,  conceived of as an order analogous to but distinct from the order of
experience, was far from being a necessity of his system. On the contrary, it was too
deeply  marked by his  pre-critical  ontological  commitments  to  fit  comfortably  into  a
theory  that  renounced  any  ambition  of  describing  the  intelligible.  It  also  left  an
irreconcilable tension between a universalistic morality and the presumptive needs of
individuals with unique intrinsic properties. Setting Kant’s ontology aside thus did more
than allow Fichte to incorporate epigenetic biology into his philosophy. It let him develop
Kant’s fundamental insights with more coherence and rigor than Kant could.41 It opened
the  door  to  a  transformation  of  the  noumenon/phenomenon  relationship,  the
recognition that perception and subjectivity emerge together, and the discovery of an
ethics that is at once universal in its demands and solicitous of individual needs. The
means were new, but the ends were recognizably Kant’s. There is thus some justice to his
claim that Fichte was a better Kantian than was Kant himself.
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ABSTRACTS
This paper explores the similarities and differences between Kant and Fichte that are wound
around a single, seemingly tangential subject: their arguments from biology. The most extensive
discussions of biology in their work both came in the last decade of the eighteenth century, in
Kant’s Critique of Judgment and in Fichte’s System of Ethics and Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. On
first  reading the accounts  appear  extraordinarily  similar.  But  the two philosophers  begin to
diverge as they move forward. Both invoke the notion of a formative drive that guides and impels
self-organization,  the  Bildungstrieb  that  features  prominently  in  the writing of  Blumenbach.
Kant, though, praises Blumenbach not so much for his ideas as for his caution in applying them,
and interprets the drive as nothing more than the “ability of an organized body to take on …
organization.” Fichte, on the other hand, characterizes the Bildungstrieb as “a drive to form or
shape or to cultivate and ... a drive to allow oneself to be formed or shaped or cultivated.” There
is a far more obvious way in which the two philosophers differ, though. Hardly anything seems
less Kantian than a discussion of biology, and biological drives at that, in a System of Ethics. The
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moral law flies in the face of all inclination, and what are those inclinations but the promptings
of our nature as physical organisms? From a Kantian perspective it is hard to see how biology
could help us comprehend or comply with a law that is grounded in something utterly apart from
our  physical  being.  By  incorporating  it  into  his  ethical  treatise,  though,  Fichte  seems  to  be
moving in just that direction.
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